

Exclusion and Violence After the Egyptian Coup

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Abstract

Scholars of Islamism have long grappled with the relationship between political participation and ideological change, theorizing that political exclusion and state repression increase the likelihood of Islamist groups using violence. The trajectory of post-2011 Egypt offers a chance to systematically evaluate these theories using subnational data. Pairing district-level electoral returns from pre-coup presidential elections with post-coup levels of anti-state and sectarian violence, we find that districts where Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate Mohammed Morsi performed well in 2012 witnessed more anti-state and sectarian (anti-Christian) violence following the 2013 military coup. The same relationship holds for the performance of liberal Islamist Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, which is consistent with arguments that political exclusion alone may also drive violence.

Keywords

Egypt – elections – exclusion-radicalization – Islam and politics – violence

1 Introduction

If the early years of the “Arab Spring” prompted speculation about how electoral openings would influence Islamist parties, the subsequent renewal of authoritarianism and political exclusion of Islamists has focused attention on

whether closing avenues of political participation would radicalize them. Alongside the better-known “inclusion-moderation” thesis, this so-called “exclusion-radicalization” argument has also featured in analysis of Islamist parties and movements, both before and after 2011. To date, most of this literature has been qualitative and focused on the mechanisms through which political exclusion engenders the adoption of violent behavior. In this paper, we build on these detailed studies to approach the exclusion-radicalization question quantitatively, systematically exploring if forcible exclusion from politics correlates with increased violence afterwards.

We explore the exclusion-radicalization thesis with observational data drawn from contemporary Egypt. A military coup on July 3, 2013 ended Egypt’s democratic transition and triggered a wave of political violence across the country. Our ecological research design pairs district-level, pre-coup election returns with post-coup patterns of violence to identify whether a significant correlation exists between the electoral behavior of ordinary citizens before the coup and the violent incidents after the Islamists’ electoral option was suddenly and forcefully foreclosed. Our research design speaks to neither motivations nor mechanisms, and we are careful to note that our research design tracks correlations, not causation. However, coupling official electoral data with third-party tracking of violent incidents helps us to test implications of theories about the relationship between Islamist political exclusion and subsequent acts of violence.

Our evidence suggests that the level of anti-state and sectarian violence in a census district following the 2013 coup is significantly correlated with Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate Mohammed Morsi’s district-level performance in the 2012 presidential elections. Supplementary analysis leverages additional variation among different candidates in first-round presidential contests in 2012 to explore the relationship between political exclusion, as separate from violent repression, on post-coup patterns of violence. That analysis shows that pre-coup districts with higher numbers of Islamist but non-Brotherhood voters (meaning, those who supported candidate Abdel Moneim Abu El Fotouh) also displayed a higher likelihood of anti-state and sectarian attacks. This suggests that political exclusion, as distinct from the combined exclusion and violent repression suffered by tens of thousands of Brotherhood supporters following the 2013 coup, may alone be enough to radicalize Islamist-leaning voters.

The paper proceeds as follows. We first revisit the exclusion-radicalization thesis and draw out implications for how exclusion might affect supporters of Islamist parties, rather than the parties or movement elites themselves. We then briefly summarize developments in Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s

role therein, through the 2013 coup. Next, we turn to district-level correlations between support for Morsi in the 2012 presidential election and violence against the state and Egypt's Christian minority. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results.

2 The Exclusion-Radicalization Thesis Revisited

A majority of explanations for violent behavior focus on two main causal factors: relative economic deprivation and social alienation. The frustration-aggression approach coined by Ted Robert Gurr argues that grievances arise from economic and social conditions, which lead to the development of particular worldviews and related organizations. These conditions finally push individuals to engage in extra-political activities, the most extreme of which is violence.¹

As Jillian Schwedler notes, scholars use the term radicalization to mean many different things.² Existing studies on repression of Islamists have looked at how exclusion shapes Islamists' ideologies and worldviews,³ which, in turn, affect political behaviors including official rhetoric,⁴ political strategies,⁵ and internal organization.⁶ We are interested here in radicalization conceptualized as a shift to political violence, defined as violence perpetuated by non-state

- 1 Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
- 2 Jillian Schwedler, "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis," *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 347–76.
- 3 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Omar Ashour, *Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- 4 Gunes Murat Tezcur, "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors," *Party Politics* 16 (2010): 69–88; Gunes Murat Tezcur, *The Paradox of Moderation: Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010); and Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, "Do Muslims Vote Islamic?" *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 21 (2010): 50–63.
- 5 Janine A. Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38, no. 4 (2006): 539–60; Jillian Schwedler and Janine A. Clark, "Islamist-Leftist Cooperation in the Arab World," *ISIM Review* 18, no. 2 (2006); and Nathan J. Brown, "Pushing Toward Party Politics: Kuwait's Islamic Constitutional Movement," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Papers* 79 (2007).
- 6 Mona el-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 373–95; and Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher, "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament," *Middle East Report* 36, no. 240 (2006): 32.

actors against either state or other non-state actors for politically motivated purposes.⁷

Explanations for Islamist radicalization and the use of violence often focus on socioeconomic immiseration and psychological alienation stemming from failed modernization, excessive Westernization, and the cognitive dissonance these processes supposedly produce for Muslims.⁸ While much has been written about the relationship between deprivation, alienation, and violence, the socioeconomic frustration-aggression theory fails to hold up to empirical scrutiny. Deprivation or alienation alone does not explain the use of violence. Instead, deprived groups must also feel like militant action is the *only* option available to them.⁹

This is where the exclusion-radicalization thesis differs from a large literature on the causes of political violence. Here, the *political* context, rather than the economic or social environment, is important for why individuals turn to violence. Individuals become violent when states deny them meaningful access to political institutions through repressive policies. As a result, individuals transform from “moderates,” those who shun violence and instead work for reform through state institutions, to “radicals” who refuse to participate in state institutions and consider violence necessary to achieve their aims. The causal chain is similar to that of the frustration-aggression thesis, but instead of socioeconomic grievances, political grievances mobilize individuals to violence. The focus on *behavior* rather than *ideology* is important and suggests that the exclusion-radicalization thesis is a generalizable theory. Though we focus on Islamist radicalization, the process of radicalization is an understandable defensive reaction against state repression of any politically excluded group and is thus potentially generalizable beyond the Islamist case. In the words of Mohammed Hafez, “exclusionary and repressive political environments force Islamists to undergo a near universal process of radicalization,

7 Christian G. De Vito, “Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Western European Prisons (1965–1986),” in *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict* (Ashgate Farnham: Burlington, 2014), 71–91.

8 Hamied N. Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 1 (1984): 123–44; Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Politics and Religion in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991); and R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse University Press, 1995).

9 Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). See also Robert W. White, “From Peaceful Protest to Guerilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” *American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 6 (1989): 1277–302, 1281–2; and Douglas McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

which has been witnessed by so many rebellious movements, including ethnonationalist, socialist, and right-wing movements.”¹⁰

Because it is the state and its proxies that adopt the repression that constitutes exclusion, it is logical that the violence of excluded actors would target state institutions. However, the circumstances that propel politically aggrieved individuals to undertake violence against the repressive state might also result in violence against other targets who appear either to be indirectly related to the state or supportive of its repressive behavior. Political exclusion creates anti-system ideologies that “deny the possibility of personal or group neutrality; every individual is responsible for maintaining or overthrowing the system under which he or she lives.”¹¹ As a result, repressed groups adopt an ‘us-versus-them’ mentality, and anyone deemed to be tactically or overtly supportive of the regime becomes an enemy.

3 The Brotherhood in Egyptian Politics, 1952–2013

We explore the relationship between exclusion and radicalization in the context of modern Egypt, and specifically regarding the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a religious organization promoting a return to Muslim values.¹² The organization’s activities focused on Islamic education and charity, and it became integrated into local communities by building mosques and Islamic schools, and providing social services.¹³ The organization conceived of its Islamic *da’wa* (preaching) and *tarbiyya* (education) programs as being closely related to a larger political mission in that these activities were intended to Islamize Egyptian society and reform the political, economic, and social life of the country.¹⁴

After the July 1952 Free Officers Coup, the Brotherhood played an important role as a political opposition to three successive authoritarians and was regularly punished for it. The organization became one of the first targets of the nascent state after a Muslim Brotherhood member attempted to assassinate

10 Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

11 Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel*, 155.

12 Steven Brooke and Neil Ketchley, “Social and Institutional Origins of Political Islam,” *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 2 (2018): 376–94.

13 Steven Brooke, *Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

14 Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); and el-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.”

president Gamal Abdel Nasser in October 1954. In response, Nasser initiated a major crackdown on the Brotherhood that persisted until 1971.¹⁵ The crackdown was considered the largest in the modern history of Egypt (prior to the events of 2013).¹⁶ The Brotherhood's relationship with Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, was more cordial but still ended in conflict. Sadat reversed a number of policies in a self-declared "correction of the revolution" and purged Nasserists and socialists from posts in the upper echelons of government.¹⁷ However, the Brotherhood began to publicly criticize Sadat, and his tolerance of the Brotherhood abated. In September 1981, one month before his assassination, security services rounded up 1,500 civil and political leaders, including many high-ranking Brotherhood leaders.

Upon taking office, Hosni Mubarak initially pursued a policy of non-confrontation with the Brotherhood, although relations between the two soured as the Brotherhood pressed their social and political agenda. By the mid-1990s, waves of arrests against the group occurred semi-regularly, and many of those apprehended were tried in military tribunals where the regime could seek sentences longer than a year (typical judgments included three, five, seven, and ten-year sentences) and included punishments of hard labor. Many of those sentenced in the military tribunals remained in jail, concentrated in the high-level security Tora prison, through the 2011 uprisings.

The Muslim Brotherhood dove head first into the electoral politics that followed Mubarak's February 2011 departure from power. The Brotherhood applied for and – for the first time in its history – received a license to operate a legal political party. During the 2011–2012 elections for the National Constituent Assembly, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) led the Democratic Alliance, which gathered 37.5 percent of votes, the highest percent won by a single list. Then Mohamed Morsi, a former member of the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau who had represented the organization in parliament under Mubarak, defeated former Prime Minister and Air Force commander Ahmed Shafiq with 51.7 percent of the vote in the second-round, and was inaugurated as Egypt's first democratically elected president on June 30, 2012.

15 Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class, and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, ed. Said A. Arjomand (Oxford: Macmillan in association with St. Anthony's College, 1984); and Barbara Zollner, "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 3 (2007): 411–33.

16 Said K. Aburish, *Nasser, the Last Arab* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 54.

17 Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 2004).

Morsi's brief tenure was marked by increasing polarization. In the days before the presidential election, a court order dissolved the FJP-dominated assembly, citing the illegality of elections, and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued decrees granting itself legislative power and an oversight role for the constitution-drafting process. For their part, the Brotherhood's status as the primary victims of the old regime impeded their ability to cooperate and compromise with other groups.¹⁸ When secular parties walked out of the December 2012 constitutional proceedings, the FJP and its allies approved a document without their input and quickly brought it to a referendum vote.

On the one-year anniversary of Morsi's inauguration, the youth group *Tamarod* (Arabic for "Rebellion"), conspicuously aided by elements of Egypt's security apparatus, organized massive protests calling for early elections.¹⁹ On July 3, 2013, military officers removed Morsi from power, suspended the constitution, and installed an interim government. In the aftermath of the coup, the military began a crackdown on the Brotherhood that quickly surpassed previous efforts. In August 2013, at least 817 people were killed and thousands more were injured when the military used force to clear protesters demonstrating in support of Morsi in Cairo's Rabaa al-Adaweya and al-Nahda squares.²⁰ Within a year of the coup, official estimates put the number of detained at 16,000. Wikithawra, an initiative run by the independent Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, recorded closer to 40,000 detentions, the majority of them Brotherhood members or supporters.

Anecdotal evidence from policy and media reports have suggested that recent increases in anti-state and sectarian violence in Egypt is related to the 2013 coup and the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood's older generations have publicly affirmed their decades-long opposition to violence as immoral and counterproductive, the organization formally endorsed an open letter, "The Egypt Call," which was written by more than 100 Muslim scholars and included language such as "the aggrieved party has the right to fight back against the aggressor."²¹ Analysts maintain that some Brotherhood members appear to be driving the trend towards violence, having changed their opinions about the efficacy of peaceful political participation or

18 Elizabeth R. Nugent, *After Repression: How Polarization Derails Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).

19 Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in a Time of Revolution* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

20 Omar Shakir, *All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt*, Human Rights Watch, 2014.

21 As reported in *The New York Times*. David K. Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, "Push for Retribution in Egypt Frays Muslim Brotherhood," *The New York Times*, August 5, 2015.

as a result of violence inflicted on them by the state.²² In a 2013 report for Brookings titled “Is the Crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood Pushing the Group toward Violence?” a Brotherhood youth activist located in Istanbul did not discount “increased possibilities that a not-insignificant segment of members and supporters will resort to responding to the state’s violence with violence, whether on an individual, decentralized level, or by joining more violent groups such as ‘Sinai Province’ or ‘Al-Murabiteen,’ or even by joining the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq” in response to the Brotherhood’s exclusion from the political sphere.

4 Research Design

Prior research on exclusion-radicalization has tended to examine the ways in which electoral participation or its converse, exclusion, influences the leaders of particular groups as well as their rhetoric, internal structure, tactical choices, or ideological orientation. As noted above, much of the post-2013 research on the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in violence has followed these same lines, often using highly focused case studies of particular ideologues or various splinter groups that emerged following 2013. Our exploration builds on this prior work but differs in its data and methods. Specifically, our goal is to understand if the concentration of votes for Islamist candidates in 2012’s free and democratic political environment correlates with patterns of violence following the re-establishment of Egyptian autocracy in July of 2013. We leverage a subnational research design to systematically identify the particular social and political contexts that correlate to our outcomes of interest.

5 Key Dependent Variables

We measure violence in two ways based on whether the target of violence is the state or other citizens who are perceived to be in some way responsible for political exclusion. First, we measure *anti-state attacks*. To construct a

²² See, e.g., Khalil al-Anani, “Extremism Under Sisi,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 8, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-01-08/extremism-under-sisi>; Mokhtar Awad, “Understanding the Ideological Drivers Pushing Youth Towards Violence in Post-Coup Egypt” in POMEPS “Rethinking Islamist Policy” January 2014 collection of memos; and Mokhtar Awad, “The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, July 27, 2017, <https://www.hudson.org/research/13787-the-rise-of-the-violent-muslim-brotherhood>.

measurement of anti-state violence, we utilize the available list of geo-located violent incidents from the University of Maryland's open-source Global Terrorism Database (GTD)²³ over the period July 4, 2013, the day after the coup, to July 30, 2016. The dataset records violence targeting persons representing the state, as well as state infrastructure. After removing the 32 incidents related to Christians (see below), we were left with 1,532 incidents of anti-state violence during this period. We assigned these incidents to Egyptian census districts (*markaz/qism*) using their provided geographic coordinates. This allowed us to assemble a district-level count of anti-state attacks.

Second, we measure sectarian incidents, or *anti-Christian violence*. It is conceivable that excluded citizens use violence against not only the state, but also specific sectors of the population perceived to be particularly supportive of their exclusion (or perhaps because they are more or less protected than state targets). While Egypt's Christian community has for decades been subject to both structural discrimination from the Egyptian state and violence from local vigilantes, high-profile support from some Christian elites for the July 2013 coup could conceivably have led to increased violence against them following the coup. We construct this measurement with data obtained from Eshhad, which produced a similarly geo-located dataset of sectarian attacks in Egypt from August 4, 2013 to August 24, 2016.²⁴ We limited the dataset to anti-Christian attacks (on persons and property) and dropped all cases where the perpetrators were linked to the state (for instance, official incitement or abuse of Christians by state security forces). The remaining incidents were then assigned to the appropriate census district following the method outlined above.

6 Independent Variable

Our key independent variable comes from Egypt's first-round presidential election, held over two days in May of 2012. This contest, widely seen as free and fair, featured a dozen major candidates, including Islamist favorite and Brotherhood member Mohammed Morsi, prominent Islamist dissident Abdul Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, and

²³ The data is available online at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

²⁴ For sectarian violence, the Eshhad dataset improves upon the Maryland GTD database referenced above. For example, we extracted from the GTD database 32 anti-Christian incidents to reduce overlap with the Eshhad data. The Eshhad data, in contrast, includes 205 cases of anti-Christian vandalism and 156 cases of anti-Christian violence (361 total incidents). The raw data visible online at <http://eshhad.timep.org/database/> was provided to us in raw form by Amira Mikhail, Eshhad's co-founder and director.

Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi, among others. A second-round (runoff) later occurred between Morsi and Shafiq. We retrieved district-level results for the first-round contests from the Egyptian electoral commission website²⁵ to identify our key independent variable of interest, *voteshare*. Specifically, we construct a simple measure of district-level Islamist electoral support by identifying Morsi's voteshare in 2012's first-round presidential contests (Morsi's total votes/number of valid ballots).

We believe that the results of the first-round presidential contests are the most accurate for measuring Islamist support. In addition to having a high degree of salience as Egypt's founding, post-authoritarian presidential election, candidates in these elections represented many political trends and general – although not total – popular engagement with the electoral process. The multitude of choices likely means that there were low levels of strategic voting, particularly in comparison to the June 2012 second-round presidential contest where diverse blocs of voters unified behind Islamist candidate Morsi, simply because the alternative was Shafiq, a former regime apparatchik. Because of this, the first-round contests offer the best possible way to identify voter preferences, and in particular to identify geographic units where true electoral support for Islamist candidates was highest.²⁶

One overriding issue in our attempt to systematically assess the relationship between exclusion and radicalization lies in the particular trajectory of the Brotherhood in post-coup Egypt. In effect, our outcome of interest – violence – is potentially overdetermined; not only was the electoral option foreclosed to those who voted for the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012 (“exclusion”), but those individuals were additionally subject to extreme levels of state violence (“repression”) that, in some cases, amounted to crimes against humanity.²⁷ This complicates our efforts to discern whether any potential correlation with either anti-state or sectarian attacks is related to electoral exclusion, state violence, or some combination of the two.

25 The data is available online at <http://pres2012.elections.eg/round1-results>.

26 One possible alternative would be to use the parliamentary elections, which also featured Islamist participation, including from the Muslim Brotherhood. We do not do so for two reasons. First, the lower house elections occurred over two overlapping electoral maps, one based on first-past-the-post, dual-member constituencies, and the second based on a list/PR system. Second, these electoral districts comprehended multiple census districts, which would notably complicate the analysis.

27 “Egypt: Rab’a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity,” Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity>.

As an initial attempt to disentangle these processes, we construct three other voteshares from the 2012 first-round presidential race for comparison: El-Fotouh, Shafiq, and Sabahi. A high profile Brotherhood dissident and critic, El-Fotouh still operated within the realm of political Islam, and counted many in that broad camp among his supporters.²⁸ Indeed, the Salafi Hizb al-Nour formally endorsed El-Fotouh in these first-round presidential elections, in some measure to prevent the Brotherhood from establishing a monopoly over Egyptian politics.²⁹ Importantly for our purposes, following the coup in July 2013, El-Fotouh's supporters were excluded from electoral participation but generally not subject to state repression to the same degree as the Brotherhood.³⁰ Including the 2012 voteshare of El-Fotouh into the analysis therefore offers a chance to explore whether electoral exclusion alone is correlated with our outcomes of interest. Shafiq was a former minister under Mubarak and represented support for the old regime, while Sabahi represented a secular alternative from the former opposition.

Second, what of those voters whose electoral options were not foreclosed following the coup? This is an important comparison for making sense of the behavior of pro-Islamist districts after 2013. Recall that the 2014 (post-coup) presidential elections featured two candidates: the eventual winner Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and opposition candidate Sabahi. Sabahi himself had actually participated in the first-round contests two years earlier (in our elections of interest) and, while El-Sisi was new in 2014, his candidacy was to some extent built on the remnants of support for the previous authoritarian regime, which had in the 2012 first – (and later second-) round contests coalesced Shafiq. If electoral exclusion breeds contentious mobilization, then the inverse may also be true: the continued inclusion of Sabahi and Shafiq could dampen violent activism in those places where their voters were relatively more concentrated.

28 Quite obviously, El-Fotouh also attracted a notable non-Islamist constituency, although its precise dimensions are difficult to ascertain.

29 David Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, "Support from Islamists For Liberal Upends Race in Egypt," *The New York Times*, April 28, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/world/middleeast/conservatives-in-egypt-back-liberal-to-oppose-brotherhood.html>; and Khalil al-Anani, "Egypt's Blessed Salafi Votes," *Foreign Policy*, May 2, 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/02/egypts-blessed-salafi-votes/>.

30 The El-Fotouh comparison also helps to explore a second possibility – that extra-institutional contention correlates not to basic electoral exclusion but rather expulsion from a position of tangible political power (i.e. the presidency). Since El-Fotouh was eliminated in the first-round contests, he never held political power.

7 Control Variables

We use a version of the 2006 Egyptian census data to adjust for a variety of relevant district-level covariates.³¹ These include:

- Percent Male.
- Percent Christian.
- Percent Illiterate.
- Frontier Governorate (dummy).³²
- Governorate Capital (dummy).
- Rural (dummy).³³

To account for a district's baseline levels of violence prior to the military coup, we also construct from the GTD dataset a linearly transformed $(n + 1)$ log count of violent incidents in a district between February 11, 2011 and July 3, 2013. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all variables.

8 Assessing Violence After Exclusion

Do patterns of violence after 2013 correlate with levels of electoral support for Islamist candidates in 2012? The implication from the literature that we are evaluating is that in districts where Islamist candidates were most supported prior to the coup, political exclusion and repression would correlate with levels of violence after the coup. In the below sections, we analyze two implications of this argument. In the section immediately following, we consider the correlates of anti-state violence as the dependent variable. In the subsequent section, anti-Christian attacks is the dependent variable.

9 Anti-State Attacks

We first analyze the relationship between 2012 district-level voteshares and anti-state incidents after the 2013 coup. As the dependent variable is an aggregate, district-level count (of violent anti-state incidents) and skewed, Table 2 reports the results of a negative binomial model estimating the relationship

31 The data is from a large-scale, pre-test of the 2006 census, available online at www.ipums.org. The 2006 census is the most recent publicly available census.

32 South Sinai, Marsa Matrouh, Red Sea, and al-Wadi al-Gedid. Because it is an extreme outlier in terms of the number of terrorist attacks, we drop from the analysis the eight districts in Northern Sinai.

33 All *markaz* districts are treated as rural, while *qism* and *medina* are treated as urban.

TABLE 1 Summary statistics

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD
Pre-Coup Violence (log)	.034	0	0	2.485	.223
Percent Male	.514	.511	.472	.737	.024
Percent Christian	.053	.029	0	.423	.067
Percent Illiterate	.278	.278	.04	.541	.115
Frontier Governorate (Dummy)	.056	0	0	1	.231
Governorate Capital (Dummy)	.311	0	0	1	.464
Rural District (Dummy)	.49	0	0	1	.501
Morsi Voteshare	.252	.237	.04	.62	.11
El-Fotouh Voteshare	.182	.169	.036	.826	.079
Shafiq Voteshare	.225	.206	.028	.631	.122
Sabahy Voteshare	.196	.171	.007	.784	.134
Registered Voters (Exposure)	177,995.2	161,453.5	7,381	2,089,703	159,217.2
Sectarian Violence (Incidents)	1.289	0	0	41	4.046
Anti-State Violence (Incidents)	1.87	0	0	68	5.509

between the number of anti-state incidents in a given district as a function of the four candidates' respective voteshares in that district during the 2012 first-round presidential elections.³⁴

To ease interpretation of these results, Figures 1 through 3 present the marginal effects of the three statistically significant candidate voteshares on the outcome of interest: anti-state incidents. In each, the x-axis (candidate vote share) is presented from their 5th to 95th percentile.

Correlates of anti-state attacks are consistent with predictions from the exclusion-radicalization hypothesis. There is a particularly strong relationship

34 Because the census data is a subsample of district residents rather than the population, we construct an exposure term that is the natural log of the number of registered voters in each district from the 2012 second round presidential election.

TABLE 2 Correlates of anti-state violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Anti-State Incidents	Anti-State Incidents	Anti-State Incidents	Anti-State Incidents	Anti-State Incidents
Pre-Coup Disorder	2.209*** (0.657)	2.398*** (0.631)	2.373*** (0.641)	2.226*** (0.652)	2.302*** (0.640)
Percent Male	10.18+ (6.104)	5.218 (5.786)	9.226 (5.788)	9.571 (6.056)	8.912 (5.747)
Percent Christian	-4.566* (1.909)	-4.676* (1.874)	-3.736+ (1.931)	-3.711+ (2.035)	-6.568** (2.021)
Percent Illiterate	-4.203** (1.382)	-6.906*** (1.591)	-5.446*** (1.436)	-4.306** (1.390)	-6.107*** (1.510)
Frontier Governorate	-0.334 (0.647)	-0.138 (0.655)	-0.921 (0.642)	-0.388 (0.642)	-0.724 (0.646)
Governorate Capital	0.300 (0.311)	0.420 (0.298)	0.327 (0.301)	0.290 (0.310)	0.454 (0.302)
Rural District	-1.162** (0.378)	-1.366*** (0.371)	-0.906* (0.373)	-1.131** (0.378)	-1.424*** (0.377)
Morsi Voteshare (2012 1st Round)		5.013*** (1.377)			
Abu El-Fotouh Voteshare (2012 1st Round)			5.332** (1.624)		
Shafiq Voteshare (2012 1st Round)				-1.160 (1.010)	
Sabahi Voteshare (2012 1st Round)					-4.550** (1.477)
Observations	280	279	279	279	279
Pseudo R^2	0.121	0.137	0.134	0.124	0.135

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




FIGURE 1 2012 Morsi voteshare and anti-state violence




FIGURE 2 2012 Abu El-Fotouh voteshare and anti-state violence




FIGURE 3 2012 Sabahi voteshare and anti-state violence

($p < 0.001$) between those districts in which Morsi performed well in the 2012 first-round presidential contests and the places where violent anti-state incidents – as charted in the Global Terrorism Database – were concentrated following the 2013 coup. Put into substantive terms, a district where Morsi dramatically underperformed electorally (i.e. the fifth percentile) was predicted to witness approximately seven incidents of anti-state violence, while a district where he dramatically overperformed (the 95th percentile) would be predicted to witness approximately 126 incidents (Figure 1).

The relationship of anti-state attacks to the other three candidates' voteshares are also instructive. Liberal Islamist Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh's district-level voteshare in 2012 was also positively correlated ($p < 0.001$) with the concentration of anti-state incidents in a given district following the coup (Figure 2). Given our assumption that El-Fotouh's voters were excluded from politics but not subjected to systematic state violence approaching the scale of Morsi voters, this result is consistent with an argument that electoral exclusion alone correlates with violence. Figure three shows the dynamic operating more or less as the hypothesis would predict for the non-excluded candidate. Especially in the case of Sabahi, continued electoral *inclusion* following the coup – the ability to run in opposition to Abdelfattah El-Sisi in the 2014 presidential elections – is strongly inversely correlated with anti-state attacks

($p < .01$).³⁵ However there is no strong relationship in the case of the other “included” candidate, former regime apparatchik Ahmed Shafiq.³⁶ While the coefficient suggests the same inverse relationship to anti-state attacks that marks Sabahi, the relationship is not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.778$).

These results generally support one key empirical implication of the exclusion-radicalization hypothesis, in that patterns of pre-exclusion political support correlate with post-exclusion violence against the state. This relationship was especially strong for both Morsi, the main excluded candidate, and a second Islamist candidate El-Fotouh, whose supporters were politically excluded, but generally not violently repressed to the same extent as Morsi supporters.

10 Sectarian Incidents

We also analyze the district-level relationship between 2012 voteshares and anti-Christian violence incidents after the 2013 coup. As the dependent variable is again an aggregate count (of incidents) and skewed, Table 3 reports the results of a negative binomial model with the same specifications as Table 2 to estimate the correlates of anti-Christian incidents.

Again, to ease interpretation of the results in Table 3, Figures 4 through 7 plot the marginal effects of the statistically significant candidates’ respective voteshares (again, from their 5th to the 95th percentile) on anti-Christian incidents following the coup.

If the results in the prior section suggest that districts with a preponderance of pro-Islamist voters before the coup were more likely to witness greater anti-state violence following the coup, Table 3’s correlations suggest that those districts were also more likely to feature a higher number of attacks on Egypt’s Christian population. As with clustering of anti-state violence, the correlation with Morsi’s voteshare was positive and quite strong ($p < .001$). In substantive terms, a district where Morsi’s vote share was in the 5th percentile was predicted to witness less than one anti-Christian incidents, while a district where Morsi significantly overperformed (i.e. the 95th percentile) would be predicted to witness nearly 32 incidents. El-Fotouh’s voteshare (Figure 5) similarly demonstrates a strong positive correlation with anti-Christian violence.

35 The data (not shown here) reveals a strong correlation in Sabahi’s district level voteshares in 2012 and 2014 ($p < .009$), suggesting that his support bloc remained relatively constant over the pre – and post-coup election cycles.

36 There is a very strong $p < .000$ correlation between district-level voteshare for Shafiq in 2012 and El-Sisi in 2014 (also not shown here).

TABLE 3 Correlates of sectarian violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Anti-Christian Incidents	Anti-Christian Incidents	Anti-Christian Incidents	Anti-Christian Incidents	Anti-Christian Incidents
Pre-Coup Disorder	0.959 (0.866)	1.124 (0.736)	1.043 (0.853)	1.386 (0.863)	0.945 (0.801)
Percent Male	6.314 (7.643)	-0.132 (6.111)	7.666 (7.075)	3.785 (7.582)	7.321 (6.632)
Percent Christian	14.80*** (1.622)	13.96*** (1.384)	16.30*** (1.698)	19.40*** (2.197)	11.57*** (1.644)
Percent Illiterate	4.405** (1.588)	-0.914 (1.656)	3.037 ⁺ (1.630)	2.992 ⁺ (1.612)	1.192 (1.718)
Frontier Governorate	-1.217 (1.219)	-0.288 (1.009)	-2.331 ⁺ (1.195)	-1.567 (1.204)	-1.467 (1.075)
Governorate Capital	0.603 (0.419)	0.693 ⁺ (0.367)	0.555 (0.410)	0.472 (0.407)	0.807* (0.398)
Rural District	-0.420 (0.469)	-0.823 ⁺ (0.423)	-0.0927 (0.467)	-0.242 (0.462)	-0.793 ⁺ (0.449)
Morsi Voteshare (2012 1st Round)		9.038*** (1.547)			
Abu El-Fotouh Voteshare (2012 1st Round)			7.112*** (2.016)		
Shafiq Voteshare (2012 1st Round)				-5.527*** (1.636)	
Sabahi Voteshare (2012 1st Round)					-7.984*** (2.245)
Observations	280	279	279	279	279
Pseudo R ²	0.129	0.177	0.148	0.149	0.152

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001




FIGURE 4 2012 Morsi voteshare and sectarian violence




FIGURE 5 2012 Abu El-Fotouh voteshare and sectarian violence




FIGURE 6 2012 Shafiq voteshare and sectarian violence




FIGURE 7 Sabahi voteshare and sectarian violence

Patterns of support for the two non-excluded candidates, Shafiq (Figure 6) and Sabahi (Figure 7), display the inverse. Districts where Shafiq underperformed (i.e. his 5th percentile) have a predicted count of 10 sectarian incidents, while those where he overperformed (the 95th percentile) witnessed less than one. Similarly, districts where Sabahi underperformed are predicted to witness nearly five incidents, while those where he overperformed have a predicted value near zero. Notably, the correlation between voteshare and sectarian incidents is strongly statistically significant across both included candidates ($p < .01$), whereas it was only significant for Shafiq in the analysis of anti-state violence.

11 Discussion

Our results show a significant correlational relationship between a district's support for Morsi in 2012 and exposure to anti-state and sectarian violence after 2013. In this section, we discuss a number of potential mechanisms through which this relationship may operate, outline limitations to our analyses, and examine whether the change in violence truly represents a departure from previous behavior for the Brotherhood and its supporters.

Our analysis is correlational and therefore does not shed light on any causal pathway that may connect exclusion to violence, although it is worth engaging in some educated speculation on this point. It may be that the particular ideological or organizational characteristics of Islamist movements (and/or their voters) makes them more susceptible to either the supposed inclusion-moderation or exclusion-radicalization hypothesis than other parties or movements. In contrast, scholars find that the exclusion-radicalization thesis is predictive of behavior across different ideologies, suggesting that the mechanism connecting exclusion to violence is likely to be far more generalizable. In this case, the relationship identified in our data may be driven by unmeasured factors. For example, instead of an ideological commitment to Islamism, having voted for Morsi in expectation of improved material conditions, the deprivation (real or expected) that followed his removal may be enough to prompt violence from his supporters. We obviously do not know why Egyptians chose one candidate over the others in the 2012 presidential elections. This decision could plausibly be driven by, at a minimum, ideological, material, familial/tribal, and reputational factors, and each would potentially predict a different mechanism that *also* explains the correlations to post-coup violence identified above. Similarly, we lack the ability to explain why individuals decided to adopt violence, or why they targeted either the state or Christians, which again could be

traced to ideology, frustration and revenge, tactical opportunities, or material deprivation.

Due to the nature of our data, we can only speak to the specific sociopolitical factors that correlate – on an aggregate level – with outcomes linked to voting and violence. While readers should be alert to the pitfalls of adducing individual-level attributes from aggregate characteristics, the current lack of comparable micro-level data constrains other types of systematic analysis. And, while the July 2013 coup serves as an important point of rupture that frames our analysis, our approach is essentially static. A more refined analysis that takes into account the “dynamics of contention”³⁷ would potentially yield different results and open up different avenues of inquiry. In that vein, the analysis would likely be enriched with disaggregated data on state repression, including arrests, disappearances, and killings – although to our knowledge these data are not available. All these limitations should be kept in mind while interpreting our results.

It is also worth revisiting our findings regarding sectarian violence in more depth. Available qualitative and anecdotal evidence surrounding anti-Christian attacks after the 2013 coup again suggests that the violence was a direct departure from previous Brotherhood behavior with regards to Copts. Before 2011, Egypt’s Coptic population, which makes up around seven percent of the country, faced widespread official and social discrimination. The Egyptian government severely limited the number of Coptic churches and made the process through which Copts applied for building permits unnecessarily opaque and difficult. However, while the Brotherhood’s political position was not progressive with regards to Coptic rights, it did not condone violence against them.³⁸ Available evidence for the dozens of events that occurred yearly points to jihadists, random thugs, or police committing the vast majority of violence against Copts. As one observer put it, the pattern of anti-Christian attacks under Sadat and Mubarak generally reflected “a combination of official contempt and local prejudice.”³⁹

This changed following the coup. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that between August 14, 2013 – when the military violently dispersed the Brotherhood sit-in in Cairo – and August 21, 2013, 42 churches had already been

37 Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Dynamics of Contention,” *Social Movement Studies* 2, no. 1 (2003): 99–102.

38 Amr Hamzawy and Nathan Brown, *Between Religion and Politics*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010.

39 Jason Brownlee, *Violence Against Copts in Egypt*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, 15.

attacked, and HRW directly attributed the violence to Brotherhood supporters.⁴⁰ Prominent Brotherhood figures held the Christian community responsible for the coup, in part because of Christian support for Shafiq in the second-round of the 2012 presidential election and the Tamarod movement to topple Morsi.⁴¹ Ishaq Ibrahim, from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, said in an interview that after the coup, “Muslim Brotherhood members were spreading rumors saying that it is a Coptic conspiracy to exclude them from power.”⁴² This violence was fueled by Brotherhood grievances as much as instability, state indifference, or jihadism.⁴³ Whereas kidnapping and ransoming of Copts had increased immediately following the 2011 uprising due to state instability and economic desperation, “after Morsi’s removal, political frustration contributed to hate crimes” against Copts.⁴⁴

12 Conclusion

How do Islamist supporters respond when suddenly and violently excluded from electoral politics? Our analysis of anti-state and sectarian violence in post-coup Egypt suggests two answers of note. First, there is a consistently strong correlation between districts where Morsi amassed a large number of votes in the first-round 2012 presidential elections and our two measurements of post-coup violence. Second, our evidence suggests that electoral exclusion alone, absent repression, matters: voteshares for the excluded but not repressed candidate also correlate with anti-state and anti-Christian violence. Taken together, these findings support the implications of the exclusion-radicalization thesis.

The primary benefit of our approach is to distill broader subnational trends in behaviors across individuals aggregated at the district level. Future and

40 “Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches,” Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches>.

41 Nathan Brown and Michelle Dunne, *Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015.

42 As quoted in Borzou Daraghi, “Attacks on Copts Rise,” *Financial Times*, July 13, 2013.

43 “Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches,” *Human Rights Watch*, August 21, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches>; and Taylor Luck, “Copts Attacked: Can Egypt Resist ISIS Incitement of Sectarian Strife?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 13, 2017, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2017/0413/Copts-Attacked-Can-Egypt-resist-ISIS-incitement-of-sectarian-strife>.

44 Brownlee, *Violence Against Copts in Egypt*, 20.

existing research, particularly reliant on qualitative research or a different type of quantitative data, would be the ideal tool for better specifying and testing the mechanisms through which these results obtain.

We do caution readers from inferring too much from our findings. On the one hand, our initial analysis points to a consistent correlation between Morsi's pre-coup voteshare and both acts of post-coup anti-state and sectarian violence. On the other hand, the median number of anti-state and sectarian incidents in a district was zero; this suggests that, while statistically robust, the substantive patterning of violence is neither wide nor particularly deep. In other words, perhaps a different way to conceptualize the research question would be: given the intense and brutal crackdown on the organization since July 3, 2013, why has Brotherhood-inspired or perpetrated violence not been *more* widespread?⁴⁵

The Egyptian situation may be a distinctive or difficult one for testing the exclusion-radicalization thesis. Existing literature conceptualizes exclusion as forcible prevention of contesting democratic elections. However, the Egyptian case combined the exclusion from democratic elections with expulsion from politics more generally, accomplished mainly but not totally through heavy-handed state repression. It is possible that this is a uniquely harsh type of treatment that may uniquely engender the adoption of violence. However, we do note that this combined form of exclusion is hardly unique for Islamist exclusion in the Middle East, and a natural follow-on to our inquiry would be a comparison. For example, the Algerian case following the 1992 cancellation of elections would be an obvious place to extend the analysis. In his study of patterns of violence in that country, Kalyvas tells us that "many massacres have taken place in areas where [sic] the FIS obtained high scores in the 1990 municipal elections and the 1991–1992 parliamentary election."⁴⁶ Similar evidence may exist from Gaza after the 2005 legislative elections were cancelled. However, the possibility of different mechanisms connecting exclusion to violence suggests broadening the scope beyond the Islamist case. In this respect, a potentially comparable case would be the 1973 coup in Chile and subsequent leftist resistance, which may help to isolate the conditions under which each of the proposed mechanisms is at work.

45 Georges Fahmi, "Why Aren't More Muslim Brothers Turning to Violence?" *Chatham House/ Royal Institute of International Affairs*, April 27, 2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence>.

46 Stathis Kalyvas, "Wanton and senseless? The logic of massacres in Algeria." *Rationality and Society* 11.3 (1999): 243–285, 253.

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